Due to the rapid development of social networks, bio-informatics, internet-of-things etc., subgraph matching query can be found in various applications. Meanwhile, the increasing popularity of storing graph data in the cloud drives demands for graph query processing on a remote cloud server. However, the query results in this scenario may not be guaranteed to be correct, especially when the cloud service provider (CSP) is malicious or compromised by some adversaries, for example, a CSP might omit some edges of the graph so that its search cost would be substantially reduced. Besides, various software bugs and unintended errors are also inevitable. All current generic verifiable computation (VC) schemes applied in this scenario are not only too impractical to be implemented but also need a lot of space to locally store their auxiliary data. To that end, we have put forth both public and designated verification schemes which focus on subgraph matching problems for outsourced graph data. They utilize a modified cryptographic primitive called accumulator to realize fast verification and low local storage overhead. In addition to the two main constructions, we have proposed an optimization to make the scheme more applicable, namely, supporting dynamic updates of the graph. At last, rigorous security proofs and efficiency analysis are given, which justify that our proposed schemes are secure and efficient, satisfying the requirements of general verifiable computation protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
On account of the rich structure and semantic information represented by a graph, structured graph data is used in numerous applications, such as social networks, web graphs, biological networks, medical databases, etc. Many emerging applications depend on graphs to satisfy their query needs, such as Wikipidea's academic graph and Facebook's social graph search. Thus, graph data management has attracted significant attention, and graph query processing on large The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Leandros Maglaras . graph is an important subject of study. In this paper, we focus on verifiable subgraph matching query processing [1] - [3] which is an essential component of various applications.
Meanwhile, cloud computing provides service to customers with elastic resources in a pay-per-use manner, which largely saves infrastructure investment for them. In such a scenario, a resource-constrained client makes use of services from a cloud service provider (CSP), outsourcing its computation/storage tasks to it and paying for the corresponding services. Owing to that the CSP might be reluctant to honestly conduct the whole computation due to economic incentive, and temporary errors during computation cannot be radically eliminated, two key properties must be satisfied for a verifiable computation (VC) scheme. The first one is security (or correctness), meaning that the client should be sure of the correctness of the returned result from the server. And the second property is efficiency, meaning that the workload by the client (namely, verification of the result) should be less than conducting the computation by herself from scratch.
A Motivation Story. Consider some large hospitals have a group of diseases and symptoms related to those diseases (e.g., D i , S i shown in Figure 1 , forming a small network of respiratory diseases depicted as graph G as shown in Figure 1 (a)) 1 . And due to the limitation of their storage / computation capacity, they would like to resort to a CSP so that they can share their data to some small hospitals that do not have cases of that scale, then they outsource this large graph G to a CSP. Suppose there is a patient with certain symptoms comes to a small hospital which cannot diagnose his disease. Therefore, to obtain accurate diagnosis, this hospital has to send a query about his symptoms (e.g., S 5 , S 6 , S 7 shown in Figure 1(b) ) to the CSP, i.e., a subgraph matching query with input (G, Q) is aimed to find out all foursomes in the graph G with the identical form to graph Q as explained before. However, if the CSP returns a random or false result owing to some economic consideration and/or software/hardware bugs, the client will obtain a fault diagnosis, which will imperil his/her health. Therefore, could we design a solution that guarantees the correctness of the result that CSP returns? And with the size of graph grows larger, Could we minimize the space occupied in local storage? We give an affirmative answer by constructing proper verifiable computation schemes for these issues.
As stated above, the main goal of this work is to construct a secure verifiable computation scheme for processing graph data. More specifically, we focus on verifiable computation schemes for outsourcing subgraph matching queries. Roughly speaking, a subgraph matching problem is to find subgraphs G 1 , . . . , G k of an original graph G, each of them is isomorphic to a query graph Q. The formal definition of this problem is postponed to the preliminary part.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort that supports verifiability in subgraph matching queries over a large graph in the cloud. In this paper, we consider the cloud server is untrusted, which is not consistent with the traditional ''honest-but-curious'' assumption in secure multiparty computation (MPC) but the exact model is often used in verifiable computation. In other words, the cloud server may not provide integral services for correctly completing the computation tasks, meaning that it can cheat on the client who issues and pays for the query.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose the first framework to provide secure verifiable subgraph matching query services in an untrusted public cloud. In our construction, the client can outsource both storage and computation to a cloud server, and be sure of the correctness of the two kinds of services. What's more, the cost of verification for the client is kept less than answering the query directly by herself.
• In order to reduce the verification and storage cost in the client side, we introduce and modify a cryptographic primitive, namely accumulator, as a building block to construct our scheme. Meanwhile, we in addition propose several optimizations in a bid to fit in more flexible graph data applications.
• We provide rigorous proofs and simulations of our scheme to guarantee that our constructions are secure and feasible. The proof is based on computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, a very weak and wellaccepted one, which in turn makes our result more convincing.
B. ROAD MAP
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §II, we describe several formal definitions of existing problems, assumptions as well as primitives that we have utilized in our constructions. Then we present the concrete verifiable subgraph matching scheme over graph data in §III, rigorous security proofs in §IV and performance evaluation in §V. Meanwhile, we introduce some recent related work in §VI. At last, we conclude this work in §VII by summarizing the main contents and proposing possible future directions.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. SUBGRAPH MATCHING PROBLEM
Given a data graph G(V , E) and a query graph 
where v i v j denotes the edge connecting vertices v i and v j .
B. BILINEAR PAIRINGS
G is a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p, let g be a random generator of G. G T is also a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p. Then a bilinear pairing is a map e : G × G → G T , and the map e satisfies the following conditions: VOLUME 7, 2019 • Bilinearity: e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab ∀a, b ∈ Z p . • Non-degeneracy: There exists e(g, g) = 1 G T i.e., e(g, g) generates G T .
• Efficiency: Group operations of G and the calculation of bilinear map e are both efficient, i.e., computable in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT).
C. (SQUARE) COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN ASSUMPTION
Assumption 1: (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption). Given k ∈ N as the security parameter. Let G be a group of prime order p, g ∈ G be a generator and a, b $ ← − Z p . For every PPT algorithm A there is a negligible function ε(·) such that:
← g, g a , g b ] < ε(k) Assumption 2: (Square-CDH). Given k ∈ N as the security parameter. Let G be a group of prime order p, g ∈ G be a generator and a $ ← − Z p . For every PPT algorithm A there is a negligible function ε(·) such that:
Pr[g a 2 ← g, g a ] < ε(k) As a matter of fact, the security of our scheme is based on Square Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption described above. As proved in [4] , Square-CDH is equivalent to the classical CDH assumption introduced above.
D. UNIVERSAL ACCUMULATOR
A universal accumulator is a tuple of four efficient algorithms (Gen, Eval, WitCreate, Verify) which are defined in the following.
• Gen(1 κ , t): This algorithm takes a security parameter κ and a parameter t. If t = ∞, then t is an upper bound on the number of elements to be accumulated. It returns a key pair (sk, pk), where sk = ∅ if no trapdoor exists.
• Eval((sk, pk), χ): This algorithm takes a key pair (sk, pk) and a set χ to be accumulated and returns an accumulator acc χ together with some auxiliary information aux.
• WitCreate((sk, pk), acc χ , aux, x i ): This algorithm takes a key pair (sk, pk), an accumulator acc χ , auxiliary information aux and a value x i . It returns (b, wit x i ), where b is a boolean value which indicates whether the element is in the set and wit x i is the corresponding witness.
• Verify(pk, acc χ , wit x i , x i , b): This algorithm takes a public key pk, an accumulator acc χ , a witness wit x i and a value x i . The algorithm outputs 1 if (1) b = 1, and wit x i is a valid witness for x i ∈ χ, or (2) b = 0, and wit x i is a valid witness for x i / ∈ χ otherwise. In all remaining cases the algorithm does not accept and outputs 0. Here, we introduce the security property for accumulators, which is adapted from [5] . A secure cryptographic accumulator is required to be collision freeness. Informally speaking, collision freeness states that it is neither feasible to find a membership witness for a non-accumulated value nor feasible to find a non-membership witness for an accumulated value. The formal definition is stated as follow:
Definition 1: (Collision Freeness). A cryptographic accumulator is collision-free, if for all PPT adversaries A there is a negligible function ε(·) such that:
III. CONSTRUCTIONS
We start by giving two separate definitions for verifiable computation of static graph as well as dynamic graph. Our definitions are inspired by that given by Zhang et al. [6] . There are three participants in our model: A data owner (who is trusted), a CSP (who is untrusted) and a client (who can also be a data owner). A graph G is outsourced to the untrusted server, meanwhile, the data owner and/or the client want to issue subgraph matching queries on the graph G and then obtain answers from the server. (2), at the bottom of the 5th page.
A. PRIMITIVES

Definition 2: (VC for Static Graph). Given an outsourced static data graph G, for any subgraph matching query Q, the VC scheme can not only return a query result graph G s but also the corresponding witness Wit G s , and the client can utilize a set of parameters and the returned witness to verify the correctness of result graph G s . Definition 3: (VC for Dynamic Graph). A VC scheme for dynamic graph is a VC scheme for static graph that additionally provides add/delete operations to the outsourced data graph G: Given an outsourced data graph G, during a subgraph matching query, for any add/delete operations, the cloud server updates the corresponding witness. Definition 4: (Security): Suppose G s is a subgraph matching result for query Q on graph G, and Wit G s is the corresponding witness for G s . A verifiable computation scheme for subgraph matching, denoted as VC SGM , is secure if it satisfies the following condition as shown in Equation
B. OUR SOLUTION
Our scheme is based on a primitive named as cryptographic accumulator which has the ability to succinctly accumulate a set of elements S into a constant-size accumulated value acc S . Subsequently, it is easy and efficient for a verifier with the (very succinct) accumulated value acc S to verify whether an element e ∈ S or e / ∈ S. We consider as S the edge set E of the graph G(V , E). Then the client will commit all the edges, namely α (α ∈ E), into an accumulated value acc E and keep it as a pivotal component for follow-up verification. After that, the client will outsource storage and subgraph matching query to the cloud server. When a query Q is issued and the results are returned, the client verifies the correctness of the results by verifying whether the edges returned are in or not in E. The difficulties lie in the concrete construction of the scheme from vector commitment, another cryptographic primitive, and security reduction of our scheme to wellaccepted Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Depending on the scenario whether graph G(V , E) is static or not, we present a pair of schemes for VC SGM . Specifically, for the case where the outsourced graph G is static, we present two schemes for public verifier or designated verifier separately, denoted as SQ 1 and SQ 2 . The system overview of our subgraph matching schemes are sketched in Figure 2 .
First, the data owner outsources a large original graph G to the cloud service provider, generates a corresponding accumulator value acc G , and computes evaluation and verification key ek G and vk G . To be noted, in SQ 1 , ek G is the same as vk G and can be published to the CSP. However, in SQ 2 , verification key is secret which can only be stored by data owner or be sent to some authenticated (designated) clients, which is shown in red color in Figure 2 . But how to authenticate the designated users in advance is beyond the scope of this work. Then, a client submits a query Q. After the subgraph matching processing, the CSP not only returns the result G s to the client, but also computes and sends back the relevant witness Wit G s to the client. In SQ 1 , all the clients can utilize the witness Wit G s and accumulator value acc G to verify the correctness of the results, while in SQ 2 , only the authenticated clients who get the verification key vk G can verify the correctness.
For clarity, we summarize pivotal notations that are used throughout the rest of the paper in Table 1 .
Consider a scenario that the resource constrained graph data owner outsourced both storage and query processing to the cloud server, meanwhile, all the clients can verify the correctness of their subgraph matching result. We aim to minimize the overhead of data owner. Therefore, unlike existing verifiable computation schemes, which usually need data owner to store a backup of the whole outsourced graph data for verification, hereby we propose a concrete verifiable subgraph matching scheme with a general bilinearmap based accumulator algorithm [7] , where data owner only needs to store an accumulation value instead of the whole large graph. Notably, in the following we use E = {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n } to represent all the edges in the outsourced graph G. SQ 1 .KeyGen(1 κ , n): Given two bilinear groups G, G T with prime order p and a bilinear map e : G × G → G T , g ∈ G is a random generator. Let q (q > n) be the number that can be accumulated, randomly choose s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s q $ ← − Z p . For all i = 1, . . . , q, h i = g s i ; for all i, j = 1, . . . , q, i = j, h i,j = g s i s j , and set
and output acc G and the auxiliary information aux = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m q ). SQ 1 .CreateWit(ek G , G s ): G s is the result of the subgraph matching query on static Graph G, then for the i-th edge in the graph G s , its witness can be computed as follows:
where α i is an edge in the result graph G s .
The query graph Q is relatively very small compared to graph data G, thus we assume that it is easy for the client to check whether the returned subgraph G s is isomorphic to the query graph Q. Therefore, our paper only need to verify whether this result graph G s is from the original graph G or not. If there are k edges in the result graph G s , then the witness of G s is
The client verifies every witness Wit i as follows:
If the client succeeds in verifying the equation above then the algorithm outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0.
Correctness. The equation above is formulated in detail as following: Consider another scenario in which the data owner of original graph does not want all the clients to have access to verify their subgraph matching result. To this end, we propose another scheme SQ 2 in the designated verifier setting. SQ 2 works similarly to SQ 1 but with a few differences in the KeyGen, CreatWit and Verify phase.
There is another point worth mentioning, the scheme SQ 2 works for the same bilinear group G, G T , bilinear map e : G × G → G T supported by SQ 1 . And the rest of the scheme SQ 2 works as follows: q) . For all i = 1, . . . , q, h i = g s i , and set
then the client publishes ek G and stores vk G for him/herself. and output acc G and the auxiliary information aux = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m q ). SQ 2 .CreateWit(ek G , G s ): G s is the result of the subgraph matching query on static Graph G, then for the i-th edge in the graph G s , its witness can be computed as follows:
At first, the client utilizes Wit G s to conduct the following computation:
Then the client verifies every witness Wit i is the same as SQ 1 , which is shown as follows:
i , h i ) If the client succeeds in verifying the equation above then the algorithm outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0.
E. VERIFIABLE SUBGRAPH MATCHING FOR DYNAMIC GRAPH
Consider that the number of edges or vertices in a graph G will increase or decrease. In other words, the graph G will not always remain unchanged. To deal with this situation, we construct a verifiable subgraph matching scheme for dynamic graph G. To be noted, we only consider subgraph matching query of graph G with no isolated vertexes, which means we do not support verification for subgraph matching queries that contain points with no edges. Under this circumstance, when the number of vertices changes, we can easily translate these changes to that of edges. Therefore, we only discuss the situation that the number of edges will change in the following. 2 In our scenario, we only consider membership proofs, i.e., proofs that edges are in the graph. Therefore, b is always equal to 1 in this work.
Pr
Indeed, comparing with the static scheme proposed above, the dynamic one only needs to additionally provide several steps as follows for both SQ 1 and SQ 2 . DQ.Add(vk G , ek G , t, acc G , G): If the data owner or client adds an edge α t to the graph G, then computes the updated accumulator value: acc G = acc G · h t , where t is the corresponding number of the added edge. Set E ← E ∪ {α t }, meanwhile, update the auxiliary information aux into aux .
DQ.Delete(vk G , ek G , t, acc G , G): If the data owner or client deletes an edge α t from the graph G, then computes the updated accumulator value: acc G = acc G /h t , where t is the corresponding number of the deleted edge. Set E ← E \{α t }, meanwhile, updates the auxiliary information aux into aux .
DQ.WitUpdate(ek G , Wit G s , t, G s ): Here, we need to distinguish two cases:
If we add an edge α t , then the updated witness Wit i = Wit i ·h t ; If we delete an edge α t , then the updated witness Wit i = Wit i /h t . 2. α t ∈ E s . If we add/delete an edge α t , then we add/delete a witness Wit t to the collection of witness Wit G s .
Remark:
In case of preventing arbitrary updated by potentially malicious client, we can embed a signature scheme into the update algorithm to make sure that only those with right privilege can issue update requests.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We then proceed to prove the security of our scheme. Since the proofs for SQ 1 and SQ 2 are in a similar vein, we only provide a proof for the publicly verfiable setting. Our security proof follows the conventional methodology of cryptographic proofs, namely, we first suppose there exists an adversary A who is able to break the security of our scheme. And then by utilizing A, we can construct another adversary B with the ability to solve some intractable problem(s). Since the related intractable problems are widely recognized to be unsolvable, by contradiction, the security of our scheme is guaranteed.
Specifically, our proof work will be divided into two parts. In the first part (Lemma 1), we will prove that if the square-CDH assumption holds, then the accumulator scheme satisfies collision freeness property. And in the second part (Lemma 2), we will prove that if the accumulator scheme is collision-free, then our verifiable computation scheme is secure. Combined with the result (Lemma 3) by Bao et al. [4] which states that square-CDH is equivalent to CDH, we are able to prove the main theorem (Theorem 1) which indicates that the security of our scheme relies on CDH assumption.
Lemma 1: If square-CDH assumption holds, then the accumulator scheme is collision-free.
Proof: We prove the theorem by showing that the cryptographic accumulator utilized as a building block in our scheme satisfies the collision freeness property if square-CDH assumption holds. For sake of contradiction, assume that there exists an efficient adversary A who has the ability to violate the collision freeness property. Without loss of generality, we further assume that she can produce a witness Wit i for element α i such that Verify(pk, acc S , wit α i , α i , 1) ∧ α i / ∈ S. Then we show how to build another adversary B that utilizes A to break the Square Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
• B first receives a square-CDH tuple (g, g a ) from the challenger C s-CDH . To win this game, he must calculate g a 2 .
• Then B randomly chooses i $ ← − [q] as a guess for the index i on which A will break the collision freeness. If the adversary A does not return a witness on position i, the game will be aborted by B. This will incur a 1 q security loss but does not affect the validity of the proof. We will w.l.o.g. suppose A happens to make a witness collision on index i hereafter.
• B prepares parameters for A. Specifically, he first chooses s j $ ← − Z p , ∀j ∈ [q] ∧ j = i, then it prepares h i , h j 's and h i,j 's as follows:
will be returned to A. Notice that the public parameters are perfectly distributed as the real ones, so the adversary A is supposed to output a tuple (acc G , aux). The update requests from A can easily be responded by B who possesses all the information needed to perform update operations.
• After the query phase, A will output an invalid witness on index i denoted as wit i and returns it to B. B then creates the corresponding valid witness wit i by herself. She then returns g a 2 = Wit i /Wit i to C s-CDH so as to break square-CDH assumption. To see why the last step is convincing, we notice that from Equation (1) we can have that,
Besides, remember that B sets h i = g a . By combining them we can easily infer that, e(Wit i , g) = e(Wit i , g)e(g a 2 , g)
⇒ g a 2 = Wit i /Wit i However, since square-CDH problem is widely-accepted to be intractable, so the accumulator scheme is collision-free. Thus Lemma 1 holds. Lemma 2: If the accumulator scheme is collision-free, then our verifiable computation scheme for subgraph matching is secure.
Proof: Suppose there is an adversary A who is able to break the security property of our scheme, in which she can provide a valid witness Wit G s for an invalid subgraph matching result G s . That is to say, Wit G s is qualified to pass the verification algorithm but there is at least one edge
We will construct another adversary B who, by taking advantage of A, is able to break the collision freeness property of the underlying accumulator scheme.
• B first receives public parameters pp = (pk, sk) from the challenger C acc . To win this game, he must either create a valid membership witness for an element α i / ∈ E S or a valid non-membership witness for an element α i ∈ E S .
• B sets ek G = vk G = pp which will be sent to adversary A.
A chooses a challenge graph G and calculates acc G . After that, (acc G , aux = G) will be sent to B. It is obvious that all the update requests from A can be trivially responded by B with pp and (acc G , aux), and the latter will be updated to corresponding (acc G , aux ).
• Challenger C acc receives (acc S = acc G , aux) from B and for the same reason, update requests from B can be easily dealt with by C acc .
• Since adversary A can break the security of the VC scheme for subgraph matching, B obtains a witness Wit G s from adversary A such that
Then adversary B is able to successfully pick out the right α i with a probability at least 1 q where
returns wit α i for element α i to C acc and breaks the collision freeness property of the accumulator scheme. Since the accumulator scheme is assumed to be collision-free in advance, this implies that no adversary can break the security of our scheme, i.e., Lemma 2 holds.
Lemma 3: Square Computational Diffie-Hellman (square-CDH) assumption is equivalent to Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
Proof: As stated above, Lemma 3 holds for the reason that the correctness of it has already been proved by former work [4] .
Theorem 1: If CDH assumption holds, then our construction is a secure verifiable computation scheme for subgraph matching.
Proof: It is apparent to see that Theorem 1 holds if the above three lemmas hold.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We perform our simulation on a HP machine, which has 256 GB RAM and 3.6 GHz Intel Xeon E5-1650 CPU. And the operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. Our schemes are thoroughly evaluated in both static graph scenario and dynamic graph scenario.
As stated above, a verifiable computation scheme should satisfy efficiency property, namely, for the outsourced function F(·) and input x, the computation workload of verifying the correctness of the returned result should be less than calculating F(x) itself from scratch.
Suppose the graph G contains m edges and n vertices. The algorithms for subgraph matching can be roughly divided into two classes. Algorithms in the first class do not use indexes like Ullmann [8] or VF2 [9] , while those in the second class make use of indexes [1] , [2] , [10] in order to deal with large-scale graphs. Even the most efficient algorithms for directly computing subgraph matching problem require time complexity proportion to be at least linear of m or n. In addition, using indexes incurs extra storage demand.
We assume the original Graph G has edges ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 and different amounts of the edges 3 in result graph G s which the cloud will return to obtain simulation data. Then we generate relevant witnesses, and conduct the simulation at each experimental setting (i.e., the number of edges in G s ) for ten times and record its average verification time.
As shown in Figure 3 , during the verification phase, SQ 1 , the publicly verifiable subgraph matching scheme only needs 2.5ms to verify one edge in the result graph. And due to one additional calculation in the verification phase, SQ 2 , the designated verifier scheme needs 3.9ms to verify one edge. That is, our schemes are efficient enough (e.g., 250 -400 edges verification per second) to be applied in practical applications.
Unlike other existing verifiable computation schemes [11] , [12] , ours do not need to store the whole graph as additional information for verification. In this case, when the original graph have n vertices and m edges. Then without loss of generality, it holds that m = O(n 2 ). Other state-of-the-art verifiable computation schemes will take O(n 2 ) space in their local devices.
In contrast, as shown in Figure 4 , no matter how large the original graph G is, in our first scheme SQ 1 , we can only store a 128-byte accumulator value, which means that our scheme only takes O(1), a constant level space. While in our second scheme SQ 2 , we consider the scenario that the data owner wants to reserve his authority of verification for himself, in this case, we have to make storage tradeoff to save secret keys {s i } i∈ [q] , each of which is 20 bytes. Therefore, our second scheme needs about 19.58 kb for one thousand edges, which means our second scheme needs O(q) storage space. In this way, we can reduce the storage overhead of users significantly, which further increases practicability of our schemes.
Meanwhile, we simulate in the dynamic scenario, considering that there are some users who want to add or delete edges in the original graph. As shown in Figure 5 , when adding or deleting one edge, it only takes 0.01ms to update the accumulation value which is stored in the user side for both SQ 1 and SQ 2 . Because it only needs simple multiplication operations, the simulation results provided here are convincing arguments that our scheme can be useful in the dynamic graph setting with high efficiency.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In general, verifiable computation schemes can be classified into two categories. The first type includes verifiable computation protocols for general functions F(·) or general circuit C(·), and the second type consists of verifiable computation protocols for specific functions, e.g., set operations, polynomial evaluation, matrix calculation, and etc.
A. VC FOR GENERAL FUNCTIONS
The first general verifiable computation scheme [13] was proposed in 2010. This scheme utilizes fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [14] , [15] as a building block to turn a function F(·) into an FHE circuit C(·). Due to the evaluation functionality provided by FHE, the server can compute F(·) on input x without the secret key sk FHE of the FHE scheme, and then returns encrypted result to the client. In this way, both privacy and correctness of the computation procedure are guaranteed by the security property of fully homomorphic encryption. However, fully homomorphic encryption schemes are still prohibitively inefficient to be used in practice, which will incur too much computation workload. The scheme constructed by Chung et al. [16] is in a similar vein, meaning that their scheme also depends heavily on FHE which is impractical as well.
There are several general verifiable computation schemes constructed by other methods. One branch of these research works different from FHE-based ones is utilizing Quadratic Span Programs (QSPs) [17] to construct verifiable computation scheme. The initiatory work in this branch is by Parno et al. [11] , in which any objective function being calculated will be transformed into an arithmetic circuit with equivalent functionality via QSPs. They use amortized model where a setup work proportion to one-time computation of the function F(·) is needed. However, after this setup, the following verification work is much efficient than computing this function. A followup of this work by Costello et al. [12] has made use of the same technique but focused on other aspects of verifiable computation. More specifically, their main aim is to reduce the workload of the server side while preserving other positive features of general verifiable computation.
Goldwasser et al. [18] have solved an open problem relevant to the reusability of Garbled Circuits (GCs) [19] , [20] by constructing the first reusable garbled circuit scheme, based on which they have also proposed a verifiable computation scheme for general functions expressed by a Turing Machine. The construction methodology behind their scheme was first coined by et al. [21] . The core idea is to establish a connection between Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) and verifiable computation. For the server to conduct computation of F(·) on input x, it actually does ABE decryption operations on sk F(·) and ciphtext CT x . Then if the decrypted plaintext is in accordance with the original one, the client is assured that the outsourced computation is correctly conducted.
B. VC FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS
There are also a series of works related to securely outsourcing computation of specific functions. Benabbas et al. [22] aimed at solving delegation of computation problems for large polynomials. Their scheme relies on a building block called algebraic pseudorandom function (APRF) which is designed by themselves. In this work, they additionally constructed the first verifiable database scheme for outsourced database operations in the cloud. In 2013, Backes et al. [23] have proposed a model for verifiable computation protocols of quadratic polynomial evaluation in a special situation where the input data is extremely large and evolutionary. Fiore and Gennaro [24] have proposed a scheme for high degree polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication. For outsourcing set operations, Kosba et al. have proposed TrueSet [25] , which is a highly practical verifiable computation scheme for set operations. Canetti et al. [26] have proposed a scheme to deal with set operations over more than one set, with potential applications on outsourcing database queries for range query and pattern matching. In 2015, Papadopoulos et al. [27] put forward a scheme for outsourcing pattern matching queries over textual data to an untrusted server. An attractive feature of their construction is that the proof size is constant and very small. Jia et.al [28] utilized cryptographic accumulator to construct a hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme which could compress hierarchical levels and reduce updated key size.
All the schemes mentioned above consider functions with inputs as a string or an integer, thus the ability of these schemes in dealing with rich data types is substantially limited. To the best of our knowledge, there exist limited number of verifiable computation works aiming to deal with graph data. For instance, Goodrich et al. [29] presented authenticated data structures for various graph queries, such as graph connectivity/biconnectivity. Besides, in [6] , [30] the authors proposed a verifiable computation scheme that aims to shortest path query over graph data. Unfortunately, despite all the aforementioned works in verifiable computation, to the best of our knowledge, there are no relevant paper working on the verifiable subgraph matching problem, which is vital and popular in graph data management.
C. RYPTOGRAPHIC ACCUMULATOR
Cryptographic accumulators were first proposed by Benaloh et al. [31] with applications in timestamping, more specifically, to witness the existence of a value in a certain time. Subsequently, more accumulator schemes were proposed to apply to other applications such as redactable signature [32] , P-homomorphic signatures [33] and privacy-preserving data outsourcing [34] . Recently, Derler et al. [5] and Noar and Ziv [35] proposed a unified formal model for cryptographic accumulators and a primarysecondary-resolver membership proof systems, respectively. Ghosh et al. [36] put forward a strong privacy-preserving enhancement by introducing zero-knowledge accumulators. Baldimtsi et al. [37] have provided the first universally composable (UC) treatment of cryptographic accumulators. Khedr et al. [38] have proposed a new deterministic data integrity check scheme called cryptographic accumulator provable data possession. Boneh et al. [39] have presented cryptographic accumulators which could support distributed settings where no trusted accumulator manager exists and updates to the accumulator could be processed in groups.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that takes verifiability of subgraph matching problem into consideration. In this work, we have constructed publicly verifiable subgraph matching scheme and designated verifier subgraph matching scheme by introducing a modified cryptographic accumulator as a building block. We propose formal definitions of verifiable computation for graph data and the corresponding constructions in detail. Our proposed schemes can address the verification of subgraph matching queries no matter the graph database is static or evolutionary. At last, we provide rigorous proofs and efficiency analysis to guarantee that our constructions are secure and feasible. Note that, our work would like to leave the integrity problem in this setting as an avenue for future work and take privacy preserving graph setting into consideration.
